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APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED 
STATES. By Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 1993. Pp. ix, 284. $39.50. 
The assertion of that principle at that time, was the word, ''fitly spoken" 
which has proved an "apple of gold" to us. The Union and the Constitu-
tion, are the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The picture 
was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve 
it. The picture was made for the apple - not the apple for the picture. 
- Abraham Lincoln 1 
In his earlier work, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Consti-
tutional Aspiration, 2 Professor Gary Jacobsohn3 compared a number 
of modem theories4 of constitutional interpretation with natural law 
premises such as Lincoln's theory that the Constitution cannot be in-
terpreted without considering the goals of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. 5 He asserted that modem scholars' failure to "relat[e] the 
exercise of judicial power to the broader purposes and aspirations of 
the [American] polity"6 was a weakness undermining the validity of 
their theories. Lincoln's theory, he argued, was more honest and more 
in tune with Professor Jacobsohn's own theories.7 Jacobsohn con-
cluded his work by encouraging judges to "ask themselves how it is 
possible for them, as judges, to interpret - understand and apply -
our fundamental law if they reject, or simply are ignorant of, its 
presuppositions."8 In Apple of Gold, an analysis of constitutionalism 
in Israel, he follows the attempts of the Israeli Supreme Court to de-
velop its own constitutional interpretive theory and suggests that the 
1. Apple of Gold begins with this quotation. P. 3. It is not the first time, however, that 
Professor Jacobsohn has used it. The "apple of gold" metaphor appeared in an earlier work that 
outlined his theory of constitutional interpretation. GARY J. JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AsPIRATION ch. 6 (1986). The duplication of the ref-
erence is no accident, since Apple of Gold continues to expound upon Professor Jacobsohn's 
constitutional theory. See infra notes 2-8 and accompanying text. The quotation is attributed to 
Lincoln, even though he apparently never included it in a speech. P. 4; see also JACOBSOHN, 
supra, at 102-03. The reference is to a passage from the Bible: "A word fitly spoken is like apples 
of gold in pictures of silver." Proverbs 25:11. 
2. JACOBSOHN, supra note 1. 
3. Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government at Williams College. 
4. Professor Jacobsohn critiqued the theories of Roscoe Pound, Ronald Dworkin, Raoul Ber-
ger, Thomas C. Grey, and John Hart Ely. 
5. JACOBSOHN, supra note 1, ch. 7. 
6. Id. at 10. 
7. Professor Jacobsohn stands among other proponents of departmentalism such as Sanford 
Levinson and Stephen Macedo. SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHOR-
ITY 13 (1992). Departmentalists argue that each branch of government has the right to develop 
its own, equally authoritative, constitutional interpretation. Id. at 12-13. 
8. JACOBSOHN, supra note 1, at 140. 
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attempt, at least, comports with Lincoln's, and Jacobsohn's, natural 
law ideals. 
Apple of Gold compares Israeli and American constitutionalism 
and evaluates efforts to transplant American principles to Israel. Pro-
fessor Jacobsohn uses the Declarations of each nation to provide the 
framework for analyzing the similarities and differences between the 
two polities. The American Declaration of Independence embodies 
the "ethos of individualism" (pp. 4-5). In contrast, the 1948 Israeli 
Declaration of Independence affirms the existence of the Jewish people 
as a nation (p. 7). This contrast between individualism and national 
identity provides the framework for Jacobsohn's reflections. 
In the first two chapters, Professor Jacobsohn lays the foundations 
for his comparisons. In "Two Declarations" (pp. 3-9) and "Two Con-
stitutions" (pp. 9-17), he describes the fundamental distinctions be-
tween the two political systems. The American Declaration provides 
for natural justice principles that "are effectively the basis of na-
tionhood" (p. 9). Those principles, he asserts, officially achieve au-
thority in the Constitution, thereby giving both documents a singular 
purpose (p. 9). The Israeli Declaration embodies a similar commit-
ment to individual rights principles,9 but they are not the sole vision of 
that document. Instead, they share space with the vision of the Jewish 
people as a nation. The competition between its two visions is why, 
Jacobsohn asserts, Israel has not achieved a written constitution (p. 9). 
Consequently, constitutional development has taken place in the 
courts and, on a parallel track, in the Knesset. 10 In "Alternative Plu-
ralisms" (ch. 2), Jacobsohn argues that, although both states contain 
subgroups of diverse origins, the difference in national vision leads to 
divergent constitutional processes (pp. 18-54). The American process 
leads to assimilation, and the Israeli process begets stratification. Pro-
fessor Jacobsohn poses "the one great American counterexample, Na-
tive Americans" as a comparison (p. 52). He describes the 
development of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 196811 as a noble effort, 
but one doomed to unsatisfactory results because it was "grounded on 
premises that ignored the essential fact that Native Americans were a 
minority who did not fit the prevailing model of constitutional and 
political pluralism" (p. 19). Protecting group autonomy, a "constitu-
tional anomaly" in America, is the norm in Israel (p. 23). Not only 
9. The second section of the Declaration includes the following: 
The State of Israel will ... be based on the precepts of liberty, justice and peace taught by 
the Hebrew prophets; will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, 
without distinction of race, creed or sex; will guarantee full freedom of conscience, worship, 
education and culture .... 
P. 7. 
10. The Knesset is the Israeli legislative body. 
11. Pp. 18-25. The Act is codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1312, 1321-1326, 1331, 
1341 (1988). See generally Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 Indian Civil 
Rights Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557 (1972). 
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does Israel recognize group identities, its government supports their 
continuing vitality. Accordingly, Israel has a strong sense of commu-
nity (pp. 35-44) and departs from traditional American-style republi-
canism (pp. 44-52). 
These themes provide the undercurrent for the next four chapters, 
in which Professor Jacobsohn describes the development of constitu-
tionalism in Israel. In early efforts, the Israeli Supreme Court at-
tempted to define who is a Jew. Jacobsohn infers that, in deciding that 
a Jew who converted to Catholicism is no longer a Jew for the pur-
poses of the Law of Return 12 but the children of a Jewish father and a 
non-Jewish mother are, 13 the Court tried to balance the twin bases of 
Jewishness - religion and individual choice. Alt4ough the decisions 
appear somewhat contradictory, 14 they represented a compromise 
which chose an objective, secular definition of nationality (pp. 64-66). 
While the American perspective would demand this effort (p. 71 ), the 
Israeli vision rejected it15 and refused to diminish the religious element 
of Jewish nationality. 16 Jacobsohn predicts, however, that since "secu-
lar, democratic aspirations" are one of the two competing fundamen-
tal visions in Israel, they will continue to surface in_ the debate. 17 
Chapter Four analyzes both Israel's failure to adopt a written con-
stitution and the mechanisms developed in its place (pp. 95-135). Pro-
fessor Jacobsohn suggests first that America's ability to produce a 
written constitution was pqssible because there was consens.us on the 
"set of political principles that would serve as developmental guide-
lines of the nation" (p. 104). Israel, on the other hand, has multiple 
visions whose priority has not been settled (pp. 100-06). Thus, Jacob-
sohn perceives the ongoing constitutional debate as Israel's attempt to 
solidify its vision. 
12. Pp. 63-69 (discussing Rufeisen v. Minister oflnterior, 16(4) P.D. 2428 (1962), translated 
in SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL (SPECIAL VOLUME) 1 (Asher F. 
Landau & Peter Elman eds., 1971)) [hereinafter SELECTED JUDGMENTS]. Rufeisen is commonly 
known as the Brother Daniel case. 
13. Pp. 70-80 (discussing Shalit v. Minister of Interior, 23(2) P.D. 477 (1970), translated in 
SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 12, at 35). The halakic (orthodox) definition of a Jew is a 
person "whose mother was Jewish or converted to Judaism." P. 55 n.1. For commentary on 
Sha/it, see Benjamin Akzin, Who Is a Jew? A Hard Case, 5 IsR. L. REv. 259 (1970). 
14. Rufeisen seems to hold that Jewishness is based on religion, yet Sha/it finds Jewishness 
outside of religion. Justice Landau's concurrence in Rufeisen provides some consistency, sug-
gesting that Rufeisen's religious decision "denied his national past." SELECTED JUDGMENTS, 
supra note 12, at 22 (emphasis added). Shalit's denial of Jewishness' religious basis apparently 
did not cross the national line. 
15. After Sha/it, the Knesset amended the Law of Return to require both the Orthodox 
definition of Jewishness, supra note 13, and nonmembership in any other religion. "In effect, 
then, the secular position on the separability of religion and nationality was rejected." P. 71. 
16. "[U]nlike the American example, religion in Israel is more than an influence on national 
identity; it is a constituent part of that identity." P. 79. 
17. "The challenge of balancing these commitments in a manner that retains respect for the 
constitutional sanctity of both of them will doubtless ensure the continuing presence of this issue 
on Israel's political and legal agenda." P. 80. 
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Additionally, Chapter Four analyzes the development of judicial 
review in Israel against the background of judicial review in America 
(pp. 110-35). Professor Jacobsohn depends heavily on an article by 
Robert A. Burt, 18 who "maintains that the emergence of judicial re-
view in both countries is best understood as an institutional response 
to the presence of fundamental societal conflict" (p. 113). As exam-
ples of fundamental conflicts in American law, Jacobsohn cites the 
Federalist-Republican clashes preceding Marbury v. Madison 19 and 
the divisiveness of slavery leading to the Missouri Compromise and 
eventually Dred Scott. 20 In Israeli history, he cites the 1967 Six Day 
War as the conflict preceding the Elon Moreh decision21 and the polit-
ical party struggles surrounding the Bergman case.22 However, while 
the U.S. Supreme Court used the written Constitution to establish ju-
dicial review23 and judicial supremacy,24 Professor Jacobsohn indi-
cates that the absence of a written constitution led the Israeli Supreme 
Court to develop a position of judicial restraint (pp. 124-32). 
Although its decisions have been central in many divisive political is-
sues, 25 the Court has intervened cautiously, preferring to leave many 
fundamental decisions to the legislature.26 Without the certainty of a 
written document, Jacobsohn favors the prudence of the Court's cho-
sen path.27 
This position is consistent with the views Professor Jacobsohn in-
troduced in his earlier work, The Supreme Court and the Decline of 
18. Robert A. Burt, Inventing Judicial Review: Israel and America, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2013 (1989). 
19. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
20. Pp. 115-18 (discussing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)). 
21. Pp. 113-15. In Elon Moreh, the Court invalidated the military seizure of Arab-owned 
lands. Dwikat v. Israel, 34(1) P.D. 1 (1980), translated in digest form in 15 !SR. L. REV. 131 
(1980). Because the decision favored Arab property rights over Jewish settlers, it represented a 
bold move on the Court's part. See Burt, supra note 18, at 2071. Elon Moreb was the name of 
the settlement from which the Jewish settlers were evicted. 
22. Pp. 124-29 (discussing Bergman v. Minister of Finance, 23(1) P.D. 693 (1969), translated 
in 4 lsR. L. REv. 559 (1969)). Bergman struck down the Financing Law of 1969, which only 
financed the election campaigns of candidates from parties already represented in the current 
Knesset. Justice Landau's opinion invalidated the provision because it conflicted with the en· 
trenched Basic Law establishing electoral equality. P. 126. For reactions to the Bergman case, 
see Benjamin Akzin, Comment, 4 IsR. L. REV. 576 (1969); Peter Elman, Comment, 4 IsR. L. 
REV. 565 (1969); Claude Klein, Comment, 4 !SR. L. REV. 569 (1969). 
23. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
24. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. l, 18-19 (1958). 
25. "[T]he Court has already become a principal player in the great issues that divide the 
body politic." P. 132. 
26. Professor Jacobsohn argues that Justice Landau and others did not want to "inappropri· 
ately enmesh the judiciary in controversies more amenable to political resolution." P. 130. In 
this philosophy, one sees the equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court's "political question" doc-
trine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
27. "[J]udicial restraint in Israel means avoiding judgments of finality in the absence of a 
final settlement of regime principles." P. 132. 
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Constitutional Aspiration, in which he theorized that "constitutional 
aspiration" requires the participation of all branches of government, 
not just the judiciary.28 The example of Lincoln's opposition to the 
U.S. Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision resurfaces in Apple of Gold, 
where Jacobsohn compares Lincoln's actions (pp. 117-20) to the Knes-
set's responses to the early Israeli Supreme Court decisions.29 He sug-
gests that Lincoln's behavior was labeled as disobedient because 
Americans viewed their Court's power of judicial review as "fully set-
tled" (p. 119). Because the Israeli review power has not been so en-
trenched, its citizenry viewed the Knesset's reactions as appropriate. 
Professor Jacobsohn patently favors the Israeli approach. 30 He even 
advises the American polity to follow suit, so that "they too can profit 
from a constitutional arrangement that allows them to achieve a 
higher level of clarity in the articulation, development, and application 
of constitutional principle" (p. 135). This is certainly a provocative 
call for action, but it is unlikely to change almost 200 years of estab-
lished doctrine. 31 
Chapter Five's discussion of Israeli censorship law (pp. 136-43) 
and election law decisions (pp. 150-62) and Chapter Six's free speech 
analysis (pp. 177-227) serve as the background for Professor Jacob-
sohn's examination of the Israeli Supreme Court's selective use of 
American rights-based constitutional theory. Again, he returns to his 
two themes, the Declaration's dual aspirations and the absence of a 
written constitution, to validate the Justices' choices. When his advo-
cacy of the Israeli Court's activist pursuit of individual rights appears 
at odds with his prior criticism of similar behavior by American jurists 
and scholars, he claims that the Israeli Court's activism is acceptable 
due to the shared nature of constitutional interpretation in Israel (pp. 
143-62). "[T]he constraints imposed on the courts by the constitu-
tional principle of parliamentary supremacy legitimates a more active 
role for the courts in construing the law."32 Professor Jacobsohn fur-
ther justifies the Israeli Court's rights-oriented activist role for its edu-
28. For a discussion of Professor Jacobsohn's "constitutional aspiration" theory, see Book 
Note, Natural Law and the Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REv. 874 (1988). Burgess, supra note 7, 
at 13-22, discusses the pros and cons of departmentalist theories, including Jacobsohn's. 
29. The Knesset did not merely resist "wrong" Supreme Court decisions; it amended Basic 
Laws to overrule them. P. 71 (discussing amendment to the Law of Return following Sha/it); see 
also supra note 15 and accompanying text. For one Justice's endorsement of these reactions, see 
p. 129 n.94. 
30. "A Court pursuing the more libertarian aspirations of the nation's founding agenda can 
and ought to be checked by a Knesset that is more sensitive to the other parts of that agenda 
.... " P. 135. 
31. This is not surprising, since it follows his own ideas. Professor Jacobsohn "[r]egrettably" 
recognizes that his "is not a widely shared view, mainly because ... judges and scholars ... 
embrace the teaching contained in the aphorism that the Constitution is what the judges say it 
is." P. 134. For more objective reasons why such views are not widely shared, see Burgess, supra 
note 7, at 19-22. 
32. P. 152. The absence of a written constitution makes judicial legislation easier because 
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cational function. 33 Again, he asserts that the texts for this 
pedagogical task of the "republican schoolmaster" (p. 162) have been, 
and should be, borrowed selectively from America. 34 The educative 
role is particularly crucial and risky, he asserts, because the Court is 
developing and interpreting its constitutional text simultaneously (pp. 
168-73). On a parallel track, the Knesset also adds "lessons" regard-
ing the sanctity of Israel as a Jewish state.35 Thus, the Court's desire 
to educate the populace on democratic individual rights theory must 
not overshadow the other aspiration of Israeli constitutionalism - the 
preservation of the Jewish state. 
No issue demonstrates the differences between the American and 
Israeli constitutional visions more clearly than that of free speech. 
Chapter Six delves deeply into free speech cases from both nations to 
drive home the distinction (pp. 177-227). In particular, Professor 
Jacobsohn contrasts the American tolerance of the Nazi march 
through Skokie, Illinois36 with the Israeli suppression of Rabbi Meir 
Kahane. 37 Whereas the American vision requires tolerance, "Israeli 
law, in its criminalization of various types of offensive speech, resists a 
Holmesian toleration of what we hate ... " (p. 219). Viewed from the 
perspective of its fundamental vision, each nation's approach "can 
"[t]hejudge there cannot be accused ofrewriting a text (in the case of rights) that does not exist." 
P. 157. Nonetheless, 
to the inevitable charge that the Court in creating such a right is usurping the authority of 
the Knesset, it can simply be pointed out that it is a strange, or at any rate benign, usurpa-
tion that can last only as long as the victimized body accepts through its own inaction the 
act perpetrated against it. 
P. 157. In America, Jacobsohn argues, the Court reigns supreme, and Congress cannot effec-
tively restrain unwarranted excursions from the fundamental vision. Accordingly, judicial activ-
ism is potentially more dangerous. Pp. 152-57. 
33. Pp. 162-73. "[T]he Court has a special obligation to articulate and explain political prin-
ciples [because] •.. Israel does not have a strong democratic tradition." P. 163. 
34. Pp. 164-73. Professor Jacobsohn suggests that Israeli judges appreciate and emulate 
American jurists' use of legal scholarship in their opinions. Particularly, "the extensive Ameri-
can literature in constitutional theory is a subject of more than casual interest." P. 146. One 
suspects that Professor Jacobsohn hopes Apple of Gold and its ideas are among those the Israelis 
import. 
35. "[T]he scope of the course is not fully within the control of its teachers," because "the 
Court must now incorporate [the Knesset's enactments] into its own syllabus .... " P. 166. 
36. "We live in a society that is very conscious of racial and religious differences, in which 
open discussion of important public issues will often require reference to racial and religious 
groups, often in terms which members of those groups, and others, would consider insulting and 
degrading." P. 177 (quoting Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 691 (1978)). "[S]peech may not 
be punished merely because it offends." P. 177 (quoting 447 F. Supp. at 697). Frank Collin was 
the leader of a group of American Nazis who wanted to march through Skokie, a town densely 
populated with Holocaust survivors. P. 178. 
37. "A near certainty that the feelings of a religious or ethnic minority be really and harshly 
hurt, by publication of a deviant speech, is enough to justify limiting that speech." P. 177 (quot-
ing Kahane v. Broadcasting Auth., 41(3) P.D. 255, 295-96 (1987)). A digest of Kahane appears 
at 23 lsR. L. REV. 515 (1989). Rabbi Kahane led the Jewish Defense League, whose anti-Arab 
platform advocated acts of terrorism, abusive commentary, and other provocative behavior. P. 
178. 
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readily be assimilated into an argument for individual liberty rightly 
understood" (p. 227). 
Professor Jacobsohn concludes as he began: with Israel's continu-
ing tug-of-war over adopting a written constitution, especially a bill of 
rights (ch. 7). He infers that American critics who chastise Israel's 
ambivalence as false constitutionalism38 have ignored once again the 
twin goals of Israel's political culture.39 Consequently, Jacobsohn ex-
horts Israelis to remain deaf to the critics and continue their quest to 
forge a "picture of silver" that truly fits their "apple of gold.'' 
In his introduction to Apple of Gold, Professor Jacobsohn pro-
claims two goals: 
What I have sought to do in this book is contrast particular features of 
the constitutional cultures of Israel and the United States that are rele-
vant to an assessment of constitutional transplantation. While these two 
polities constitute the specific focus of the analysis, my hope is to con-
tribute more broadly to an improved understanding of the nature of con-
stitutionalism. [p. 12] 
Professor Jacobsohn succeeds admirably in his first goal. His exam-
ples are thought provoking and reflect the depth of his research and 
the stellar sources to which he had access.40 As a historical account of 
Israel's constitutional struggles, Apple of Gold is both educational and 
engaging. Regarding his second goal, whether Jacobsohn has suc-
ceeded in illuminating the current constitutional discourse depends on 
whether one finds his theory of constitutional aspiration persuasive. If 
it is persuasive, the Israeli experience serves as an example of how the 
exercise of constitutional development is properly shared between the 
courts, the legislature, and ultimately the people. If it remains uncon-
vincing, one must applaud nonetheless Apple of Gold's energetic efforts 
to display Professor Jacobsohn's "republican schoolmaster" 
aspirations. 
- Cynthia A.M. Stroman 
38. "The raison d'etre of constitutional government is the preservation of liberty; whatever 
other goals it may have, a regime that identifies itself as constitutional, but fails to pursue this 
goal, is simply not what it purports to be." P. 231. 
39. "[T]he presence or absence of such a document is not essential to a determination of 
whether constitutionalist claims are legitimate .... [especially] where a commitment to liberal 
democratic principles is to be reconciled with the establishment of the state as a homeland for a 
particular people." Pp. 235-36. 
40. In addition to thorough historical and legal research, Jacobsohn interviewed, among 
others, six former or current Justices of the Israeli Supreme Court. 
